

Message Text

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SONNENFELDT

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.); PARM; UR; US

SUBJECT: SALT VERIFICATION PANEL, FEBRUARY 10, 11:00 A.M.

1. YOU ARE RECEIVING BY SEPARATE MESSAGE THE INTERAGENCY
PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE SALT CONCEPTS AND A DETAILED BRIEFING
PAPER ON THAT FROM PM. THERE

FOLLOWS MY VIEW OF THE PAPER AND THE APPROACHES THEREIN.

2. THE CONCEPTS IN THE PAPER ARE NOT WELL ORGANIZED
BECAUSE, EXCEPT FOR THE DEFERRAL APPROACHES OUTLINED IN
SECTION III, THE OTHER APPROACHES ARE LINKED TO HOW ONE
DEALS WITH BACKFIRE. SECTION I OFFERS TWO APPROACHES:
COUNTING BACKFIRE IN THE AGGREGATE (OLD OPTION IV) OR
ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE LIMIT OF 250 BACKFIRE AND SEA-
BASED CRUISE MISSILE PLATFORMS.

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3. SECTION II EXCLUDES BACKFIRE. HOWEVER, THE FIRST

APPROACH UNDER THIS SECTION CALLS FOR DISMANTLING A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE SOVIET MISSILE FORCE IN RETURN FOR BACKFIRE RUNNING FREE. APPROACH B UNDER SECTION II ATTEMPTS TO BUILD ON THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS. IT WOULD PUT BACKFIRE UNDER ASSURANCES AND COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, INCORPORATE THE COMMON CRUISE MISSILE POSITIONS FROM THE MOSCOW TALKS AND REDUCE THE AGGREGATE. THIS APPROACH COULD BE THE MOST PROFITABLE WAY TO GO IN TERMS OF NEGOTIABILITY WITH THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, IT IS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY DOD, JCS AND ACDA.

4. SECTION III ADDRESSES DEFERRAL WITH TWO APPROACHES:

--APPROACH A DEFERS BACKFIRE AND SOME CRUISE MISSILE LIMITS BUT CONTINUES NEGOTIATIONS ON THOSE AND OTHER "GRAY AREA" SYSTEMS. THESE LATTER WOULD ADD F-111'S, A-6/7'S, BADGER, AND THE SS-X-20. JIM WADE LIKES THIS APPROACH. UNFORTUNATELY, IT PUTS FBS RIGHT BACK IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS APPROACH ALSO RAISES SLCM AND LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILE RANGE LIMITS TO 2500 KILOMETERS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT LESS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS.

--DEFERRAL APPROACH B WOULD REQUIRE SOVIET ASSURANCES AND COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON BACKFIRE. CRUISE MISSILES IN ALL MODES WOULD BE LIMITED ONLY BY A RANGE LIMIT OF 2500 KILOMETERS. HEAVY BOMBERS WITH ALCMS TO 2500 MIGHT BE LIMITED IN THE MIRV CEILING. THIS APPROACH WOULD ENVISAGE REDUCTIONS.

5. OF THE ABOVE APPROACHES, THE LATTER APPROACH UNDER THE DEFERRAL SECTION SEEMS THE MOST LIKELY TO PRODUCE RESULTS. IF HEAVY BOMBERS WITH LONG-RANGE ALCM'S ARE COUNTED IN THE MIRV CEILING, IT MAY BE NEGOTIABLE WITH THE SOVIETS.

DEFENSE MAY BE PERSUADED TO ADOPT SUCH AN APPROACH IN THAT IT OFFERS THEM POTENTIAL CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS ON SEA, LAND, AND AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS.

6. AT THE VP MEETING YOU MAY WISH TO TRY TO STRUCTURE
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THE DISCUSSION SO THAT RATHER THAN HAGGLING OVER THE DETAILS OF A SPECIFIC APPROACH, THE GROUP WILL FOCUS ON THREE CONCEPTUAL ALTERNATIVES:

--THAT OF TOUGHENING THE U.S. POSITION FROM THAT WHICH YOU PROFERRED IN MOSCOW (E.G., COUNTING BACKFIRE IN THE AGGREGATE OR REQUIRING THAT HEAVY ICBM'S BE DISMANTLED). THIS CONCEPTUAL APPROACH SUFFERS FROM LACK OF NEGOTIA-

BILITY .

--TRYING TO BUILD ON THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS. THIS APPROACH (SECTION II-B) IS PROBABLY THE MOST NEGOTIABLE ROUTE, BUT AS NOTED ABOVE, OTHER AGENCIES ARE RESISTANT.

--DEFERRAL FOR THREE OR FOUR YEARS OF THE BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILE IS;UES (SAVE FOR COUNTING HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED WITH ALCM'S IN THE MIRV TOTAL). THIS APPROACH OFFERS TWO ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WE SHOULD KNOW MORE ABOUT THE BACKFIRE. IF THE BACKFIRE TURNS OUT TO BE CONSIDERABLY LESS CAPABLE THAN IS NOW ESTIMATED, WE NEED NOT STRETCH OURSELVES TO LIMIT IT. SECONDLY, IN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WE SHOULD GET A BETTER IDEA OF WHICH CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS OTHER THAN ALCM'S THIS COUNTRY REALLY NEEDS AND THE CONGRESS WILL SUPPORT.

7. WE MAY BE ABLE TO GET DEFENSE TO AGREE TO THE DEFERRAL APPROACH ALTHOUGH WADE WILL HAVE TO BE DISABUSED OF HIS IDEA THAT THE FBS ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REVIVIFIED.

8. IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY SEEN THEM, YOU WILL WANT TO READ THE PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE BROOKINGS' ASSAULT ON THE B-1 PROGRAM. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE BROOKINGS' PAPER

WAS WRITTEN BY HARDLINERS WHO ARE ENAMORED OF THE CRUISE MISSILE AND STANDOFF WEAPONS GENERALLY. THIS MAY RESULT IN CONGRESS NOT ONLY REFUSING TO APPROVE THE B-1 BUT CRUISE MISSILES AS WELL. INGERSOLL

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